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CaseNo.20070673-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Bradford Laine Salters, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a sentence on convictions for unlawful possession of 
controlled substances, third degree felonies; two counts of forgery, third degree 
felonies; and obstruction of justice, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court fail to consider defendant's mental health and rehabilitative 
needs in sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews sentencing decisions for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Valdavinos, 2003 UT App 432,114,82 P.3d 1167. "An abuse of 
1
 Citation in this brief is to the current code, unless the version of the code in 
effect at the time of the offense is relevant to the disposition of the case. 
discretion results when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if 
the sentence imposed is clearly excessive/' Id. (additional quotation and citation 
omitted). 
STATUTE 
The following statute is attached at Addendum A.-
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
On April 25, 2005, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2008), and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(West Supp. 2005) 2522-R1-4. 
On October 4, 2005, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, forgery, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2008), and obstruction of justice, a class A 
2
 The case on appeal stems from charges in four separate cases in the district 
court—case numbers 051902522; 051906908; 061903235; 061906976. Where 
necessary, the record citation is preceded by the last four digits of the cited case. 
The facts of defendant's offenses are unnecessary to the resolution of this 
appeal. 
2 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-306 (West Supp. 2008). 6908-
Rl-3. 
On April 10, 2006, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, obstruction of justice, a third 
degree felony, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class B 
misdemeanor, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
driving on a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-3-227 (West Supp. 2008), and failure to pay fees, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1307 (West 2004). 3235-R13-16. 
On October 20, 2006, defendant was charged with forgery, a third degree 
felony, and obstruction of justice, a third degree felony. 6976-R1-3. 
On June 22,2006, while his cases were proceeding, defendant sent a letter to 
the court, requesting its help in having him released from jail to assist his family 
with its financial difficulties. 2522-R69-70; 6908-R32-33; 3235-R40-41.3 In the letter, 
defendant asserted that he had "suffered multiple seizures on May 6th and 7th 
which made [him] suffer some brain damage and memory loss," rendering him 
"unable to recall [his] family members," and requiring hospitalization. 2522-R69; 
3
 Early in the proceedings, without specific explanation in the record, Judge 
Himonas began to hear all of defendant's cases at issue in this case. 
3 
6908-R32; 3235-R40. He also claimed that he was "suffering severe depression" and 
that the mental health director told him that the Adult Detention Center (ADC) 
could not treat him because he needed "intense therapy," which the ADC was 
unequipped to provide. Id. Defendant further stated that he "needed to be put in to 
Mental Health Court due to [his] memory loss." Id. 
At a disposition hearing on July 14,2006, defense counsel confirmed the trial 
court's understanding that the defense would petition for a competency evaluation, 
reminding the court that defendant had experienced a series of seizures, that he had 
been hospitalized, and that defendant "no longer has a lot of his long term 
memory." R140:l-2. The court then ordered counsel to prepare the petition. Id. at 2 
On October 27, 2006, defendant moved to continue proceedings so that he 
could obtain his medical records in an attempt to be admitted to the Mental Health 
Court. R140:4. Upon hearing of defendant's efforts, the court stated, "I think that 
would be terrific," and continued proceedings for an additional thirty days for 
defendant to obtain his records. Id. at 5. 
On April 13, 2007, with the record silent as to defendant's competency 
petition or the progress of his application to the Mental Health Court, defendant 
pleaded guilty to three counts of possession of controlled substance, two counts of 
4 
forgery, and one count of obstruction of justice, all third degree felonies. R144:12. 
The court dismissed all the remaining charges. Id. at 13. 
In taking defendant's pleas, the court asked, "Do you suffer from any kind of 
condition, physical, mental, or emotional, for which you're receiving treatment." Id. 
at 6. Defendant answered, "Just depression," and, in response to the court's 
inquiries, indicated that he was taking medication, which helped him to think more 
clearly. Id. When counsel informed the court that defendant had just entered a 
treatment program, the court responded, "Great." Id. at 7. The court then directed 
defendant to have Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) prepare a presentence 
investigation report (PSI). Id. at 13. At the end of the proceeding, the court 
repeatedly emphasized that it was crucial to defendant's interests that he 
immediately—within one business day— make contact with AP&P and that if 
defendant did not make sure the PSI was timely completed he would be "sentenced 
to the max, which will be thirty years in prison." Id. at 14. After giving defendant 
two days, instead of one day, to contact AP&P, the court reiterated the significance 
of the PSI: 
But I cannot emphasize enough for you, that you will be looking 
at the max on each of these cases if you don't get a pre-sentence report 
done, and I can virtually assure you that,- - that - - well, I'm not going 
to say that, you - - it's to your benefit to get the pre-sentence report 
done. I'm sure Mr, Delicino will pound that into your head 
5 
Id. Sentencing was set for June 1. Id. at 15. 
On May25, 2007, the AP&P investigator to whom defendant was assigned 
filed a "No Show Memo/' which stated that defendant had failed to contact AP&P 
and that he had been booked into the Davis County Jail on April 28. 2252-R106. The 
memo further stated that although defendant was released from jail on May 1, he 
did not contact AP&P until May 16. Id. 
The PSI recommended that defendant be sent "to the Utah State Prison for 
consecutive terms." PSL2.4 Summarizing the investigator's evaluation, the PSI 
noted that defendant had frustrated previously offered treatment, parole and 
probation options, that he appeared to be a career criminal, and had no mitigating 
qualities that suggested a period of probation is appropriate." Id. 
The PSI included defendant's adult record, which covered almost five full 
pages, listing 112 charges, apart from those in this case, charged on fifty-six 
different dates from July 1982 to June 2007. Id. at 7-12. The PSI lists convictions for 
twenty-five offenses, including attempted burglary, theft by deception, possession 
of a stolen vehicle, forgery, and lewdness. Id. at 8-11. Twenty-nine other offenses 
4
 The details of the PSI are more fully set out in the argument portion of this 
brief. 
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had xinknown or pending dispositions, Id. at 7-12. The investigator also noted that 
defendant had "been booked into the ADC on 17 different occasions" since April 19, 
,i II ft, a Dout me time defendant was arrested for the first of the series of offenses in 
M^nros; hi ,il 7 
The PSI also im on pohilcd ,i IM» iiptLih1 null1 ivfillm hy ili'fnidLiiil s 
supervising parole agent in January 2004, commenting on defendant's mental health 
and treatment opportunities. PSI: 12-14, It noted defendant's numerous prior 
paroles, his parole conditioned on his receiving mental health treatment to address 
"cogn •- restructuring and anger management/" his lax and deceptive attitude in 
*••'••• <r TML: - , • •. .v supervisor also 
wrote that defendant "has already ? *' ^ nils'' nrnl lli.il 
" [h]e has continued to use cocaine and marijuana, left our office without permission, 
[committed] multiple curfew violations, failed to pay restitution, and [been] 
continuous[ly] dishonest[] with our agency/' Id. at 13. 
1 1 te AP&I : i i n estigatoi in this case further commented on defendant's mental 
health .imi ttvattunit opinulunitirs; ( II) ddendaiil t I.iiinctl lo hau* IVCLMIII\ been 
depressed and experienced some uriusin11 menf-il IKMIIII proMoms, including-in. 
unexplained amnesia (PSL15); (2) "[t]he courts have investigated the possibility of 
[M]ental [H]ealth [C]ourt for the defendant and are awaiting an evaluation from 
7 
Valley Mental Health/7 however, defendant had not provided the evaluation to the 
AP&P investigator (PSL12,16); (3) "[defendant].. . expressed displeasure that he 
was not accepted in the Mental Health [C]ourt program, [but his] . . . motives are 
questionable," since "[h]is efforts to seek a mental health diagnosis appear to be an 
attempt to avoid his inevitable incarceration" (id. at 16); (4) "defendant has been 
ordered to complete mental health and substance abuse evaluation numerous times 
while in the community, [but] he has never been fully compliant with treatment" 
(id.); (5) "defendant has done very little to curtail his substance abuse and obtain 
treatment while awaiting sentencing (id), and (6) "[defendant's] attitude suggests 
his need for treatment is the system's problem and he should be given a lighter 
sentence due to his mental health state and chronic substance abuse" (id). 
The PSI identified five aggravating circumstances: (1) established instances of 
repetitive criminal conduct; (2) multiple charges or victims; (3) offender's attitude is 
not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting; (4) offender continued 
criminal activity subsequent to arrest; and (5) 25 years of criminal behavior. PSI at 
Form 4:1. The PSI identified no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 2. 
The court sentenced defendant to serve six consecutive zero-to-five-year 
terms—a term of zero to thirty years—specifically indicating that it was "following 
the recommendations" in the PSI, despite defense counsel's asserting that defendant 
8 
had applied to-some in-patient programs. R139il-4 \s ivnsun (or its decision 1 I e 
court recited, almost verbatim, the five aggravating circumstances identified in 
Form 4 of the PSI: "One, you have established repeated instances of criminal 
conduct. I vvo, these cases involve multiple charges. Three, your attitude is not 
supervision in a less restrictive setting, a: J u-a \ c continued your 
M\ • l engager .. _ « cars of 
ongoing criminal behavior/' R139:4 
mitigating circumstances. R139; PSI at Form 4:2. 
Defendant timely appealed in each of his cases. 2522-R119; 6908-R80; 0235-
R96; 6976-R51. This Court consolidated the separate appeals. 6976-R-67. 
" HIMMAR^ < W THE ARUUMKNT " 
The record rebuts defendant's claim that neither the PSI investigator nor the 
trial court considered his rehabilitative needs. The trial court heard throughout the 
proceeding of defendant's menial lit-allli issues and ot his putative attempts to 
obtain rehabilitative services both of \ * 1 del i it ei icoi iraged defer idai it to i esol v e. 
Further, the PSI, which the court insisted defendant obtain for his own best interests 
and which it obviously read, abundantly reflects that defendant had been presented 
with treatment opportunities "numerous times" and that he had repeatedly 
frustrated his supervisors in failing to take advantage of those opportunities. In 
9 
light of defendant's unusually lengthy criminal record, his on-going criminal 
activity, and his refusal to take advantage of treatment opportunities or to respond 
responsibly to supervision, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing 
defendant to consecutive terms. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT ADDRESSED 
DEFENDANTS MENTAL HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE 
NEEDS, AND THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THEM IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS 
Defendant claims that neither the PSI investigator nor the trial court 
considered his rehabilitative needs, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment.5 Aplt. Br. at 7,11-16. 
A. The trial court considered defendant's rehabilitative needs in 
sentencing defendant to consecutive terms. 
Trial courts have wide latitude in sentencing decisions. "A sentence will not 
be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
prescribed limits/' State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, f 25,52 P.3d 451 (quoting State v. 
Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). '"[T]he exercise of discretion in 
5
 Defendant, nevertheless, nowhere argues that the PSI was inaccurate. 
10 
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate 
court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] 
\ iiiiilil lake the view adopted by the trial court. Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 456 (second 
.iltiTfttinri in ri^inui ilinj' Hfufi <> i Hinntl, r>84 [' 2d ML),
 LS8/ (Utah 19/8)). 
In . determining whether state of fen s< • s „ 11 • • • I ' 1"i in o i ii u r r i' n 11)' -' r 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, 
the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004). 
Defendant does not argue that the court did not consider the gravity and 
i in umstamvsol lln tpffVriMj,x the ntinil'tri ul \ Ulims, in his history and character* 
Rather, he only claims that beea/i ise tl Le PSI in \ est igator a i ml 1 h < • 1 r i a 11 (n j rt (. \ 111id I o 
consider his mental health issues and his rehabilitative needs, the oni 1 abused its 
discretion in sentencing him to consecutive sentences. Aplt. Br. at 7,11-16. 
" [ A]s a general rule, this court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make 
Imdinj'/i un the IOIORI vvhonouT it wou Id be reasonable to assume that the court 
acfnallv in.ido sun li 1 imtiiiif's ^lutc t1 I Ic/uis, JIHI1" I 11 I \ ]\ I  1, 40 I" ul bib (rejecting 
challenge that the trial court did not consid< r .ill ihc -il^ ilu1r>r\ sn ikn i iny, LKICH'S 
where, albeit without specifically mentioning the factors, the trial court stated 1 * t 
had carefully read a comprehensive PSI) (citations omitted). 
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997), anticipating the approach 
taken in Helms, is dispositive of this case. Schweitzer pleaded guilty to stalking and 
aggravated assault, stemming from his making death threats to his wife and his 
stabbing a friend during a violent, drunken binge. Id. at 650-51. The trial court 
sentenced Schweitzer to consecutive six-month and zero-to-five-year prison terms, 
observing that he was "a clear and present danger" whose actions "cried out for 
incarceration." Id. at 651-52. On appeal, Schweitzer claimed that the trial court 
abused its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive terms without considering all 
of the legally relevant factors, including that he could benefit from rehabilitation. Id. 
This Court rejected that claim. It noted that the trial court heard of Schweitzer's past 
substance abuse, which was "clearly related" to his criminal activity, his need for 
rehabilitation, and his "fail[ure] to make an effort in his own rehabilitation," 
through witnesses7 testimony, counsel's arguments, and the PSI. Id. at 652. 
Accordingly, the Court held that Schweitzer had not shown that the trial court failed 
to consider the relevant factors. Id. 
As in Schweitzer, and contrary to defendant's claim, the record, consisting of 
defendant's remarks, his counsel's assertions, and the PSI, clearly indicates that the 
trial court was well aware of defendant's mental health issues and how they 
reflected on his rehabilitative needs: 
12 
Defendant's letter 
• June 22, 2006 — Defendant asserts that he had recently suffered 
multiple seizures, leading to brain damage and memory loss, and 
requiring hospitalization (2522-R69; 6908-R32; 3235-R40); also informed 
court that he was "suffering severe depression/7 requiring "intense 
therapy," which the ADC was unequipped to provide (id.); "needed to 
be put in to Mental Health Court" (id.)m, 
Hearings 
• July 14, 2006 - counsel reminds court of defendant's seizures, 
hoipiMlization, ffiiffior^ | n t e f ^ o n t o petition 
for competency evaluation (R140:l-2); 
• October 27, 2006 — defendant moved to continue proceedings to 
obtain his medical records in an attempt to be admitted to the Mental 
Health Court (R140:4); 
• April 13, 2007 — at change of plea hearing, defendant reminds the 
trial court that he suffers depression, for which he takes medication 
that helps clear his mind (R144:6); 
PSI-July 2007 
• Defendant states that he is struggling with "mental health and 
substance abuse" and that he wanted "a life other than being 
depressed" (PSI:6); 
• Defendant's parole supervisor states that defendant was granted 
parole in 2004 offenses, conditioned on his receiving mental health 
treatment to address "cognitive restructuring and anger management" 
and on his obtaining a substance abuse evaluation with recommended 
treatment (PSI: 13); expected that defendant would be excluded from 
further mental health treatment at DRC after defendant had missed 
several classes and after an arrest on new charges (id, at 14); indicated 
that defendant had not PTOVIHPH any written documentation of 
attendance for treatment of substance abuse at the University of Utah, 
where he claimed he would be receiving treatment (id.); 
• Defendant tells the AP&P investigator in this case that he has been 
depressed and had recently experienced some unusual mental health 
problems, including amnesia (PSL15); the investigator notes that (i) the 
courts had investigated the possibility of [M]ental [HJealth [C]ourtfor 
defendant and were awaiting an evaluation from Valley Mental Health 
(id. at 12); (ii) defendant did not appear to genuinely seek entry to the 
Mental Health [C]ourt program (id. at 16); (iii) defendant has been 
ordered to complete mental health and substance abuse evaluation 
numerous times while in the community, [but] had never been fully 
compliant wilh treatment (zVf.)r(iv)"defendantKad done very HttTe to 
curtail his substance abuse and obtain treatment while awaiting 
sentencing (zd.),.and (v) defendant adopted an irresponsible attitude 
regarding his mental health state and chronic substance abuse (id). 
Based on defendant's lengthy criminal record refractory attitude, the 
investigator also opined that defendant appeared to be a "career 
criminal," . . . "incapable of living a crime[-]free lifestyle." Id. at 2 
Sentencing 
• July 20,2007 - Defense counsel informs the trial court that defendant 
has been working to gain admission to some in-patient programs 
(139:2). 
In sum, over the long course of the proceedings, the trial court heard from 
defendant and counsel about defendant's seizures, memory loss, hospitalization, 
depression, and defendant's efforts to obtain a competency evaluation, admission to 
the Mental Health Court, and treatment, all of which related to defendant's 
rehabilitative needs. 
14 
-is iii Schweitzer, the PSI, too, addressed defendants rehabilitative needs, 
recognizing that defendant was an incorrigible career criminal who had been 
repeated, unresponsive to treatment °ru *. / thereby, repudiated his 
rehab *" • »«;Js «is ,j miti<Mtin^ * : : : M K 
The record also indicates lh.il Ihr It'tdU \ »u , id * oiisidii'txi the I SI even 
though it did not expressly mention it in sentencing defendant ; 
statutory mandate. Helms, 2002 UT 12,% 11. Specifically, the court signaled its 
familiarity with the PSI report when, having heard that the State concurred "with 
the recommendations'' of the PSI investigator, it readily responded, "!' n following 
(1NI re':oni!iieiidtili(Mi^ " R1 V), V I he I'M reujnimended that" tl te Court commit the 
defendant, Bradford Srilfprs In the I'l.ih SKHr rir.mi lin eoiisei utive ivnns 
prescribed by law/' PS1.2. Thereafter, in imposing roiiseaitive terms »f 
imprisonment, the court recited, almost verbatim, the aggravating circumstances 
checked off by the PSI investigator on Form 4 of the Utah Sentencing Guidelines: (1) 
cli.1! end a in I had "established instances of repetitive conduct"; (2) the cases involved 
"nitillipk't iui^rs ' ( \] ddVn J nil's "VlliUklV ] vvas| in «1 muJuaw to supervision in a 
less restrictive setting"; and (4) defend*] nl 'Von finned i rimiiuil .jeliviifv subsequent 
to arrest/' Utah Sentencing Guidelines Form 4; R139:4-5 (transcript of sent 'end ng, 
attached at Addendum B), Tracking the report, see PSL2 and Form 4, the court 
"5 
stated that an additional reason for imposing consecutive sentences was that 
defendant had "engaged in 25 years on ongoing criminal behavior." See R69:5. 
Moreover, in earlier proceedings, the trial court encouraged defendant to develop 
his mental health record, with such expressions as "Great," and "I think that would 
be terrific." R140:5; 144:7. The results from those evaluations would inevitably have 
been included in the PSI, which the court repeatedly and adamantly insisted 
defendant obtain for his own benefit. Given that the court had expressed such 
interest in defendant's mental health status and so insisted that defendant obtain the 
PSI, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the trial court had not read and 
considered it for sentencing. 
In short, both the PSI investigator and the trial court did address defendant's 
rehabilitative needs, by properly recognizing that defendant himself had repeatedly 
frustrated treatment options. 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
consecutive sentences. 
Defendant argues that if the trial court had considered his mental health and 
drug abuse issues and his rehabilitative needs "it is reasonable to presume that the 
trial court would have imposed concurrent sentences." Aplt. Br. at 15. Quite the 
contrary, those "mitigating" factors, as defendant construes them, are so 
16 
outweighed by the aggravating factors in this case that no reasonable person would 
dispute the court's sentencing decision. 
. limself had effectively nullified the otherwise 
mitigating effect of hi> . ^;. -J rehahlikilive luvds b) his ongoing 
refusal to follow through with treatment <\ ncl lo r * vip ils benefits, Aplo Mr nl l'Vlfi. 
Further, the PSI documents defendant's constant refusal to comply with 
supervision, to the repeated frustration of the authorities: 
Show Memo" entered on May25, 2007— defendant fails to 
contact AP&P after pleading guilty in this case (2252-R106); 
• Defendant was given the opportunity to comply with community 
supervision "a number of times/' but had "continued to victimize the 
citizens of this community while being prosecuted for these current 
offenses"; defendant stated that he felt remorseful for his criminal 
conduct, "but his behavior indicates otherwise"; defendant had been 
committing crimes "for the past 25 years," and he had "no significant 
crime[-]free time in his adult life"; and defendant "has been given 
treatment opportunities" during twenty years of crack cocaine abuse 
"but [he] has very little unincarcerated drug[-]free time" (PSI:2); 
• Defendant's parole supervisor in 2003 and 2004 noted that defendant 
had committed "many violations" during "multiple parole 
opportunities," opining that defendant would not be successful on 
parole supervision" and that he "really should be returned to prison" 
(PSI at 13-14) (capitalization in original);, the supervisor also wrote 
that defendant had "continued to use cocaine and marijuana, left our 
office without permission, [committed] multiple curfew violations, 
failed to pay restitution, and [been] continuous[ly] dishonest[] with our 
agency." Id. at 13. 
1 7 
Further, defendant's criminal history was extraordinarily long, confirming the 
PSI investigator's opinion that defendant was an remorseless career criminal. That 
record listed 112 charges relating to fifty-six separate incidents resulting in 
convictions for at least twenty-five offenses committed through twenty-five years. 
PSI: 7-12. And defendant had repeatedly engaged in criminal activity following his 
arrest in this case. PSL2,11-12. 
The trial court imposed consecutive sentences, resulting in an indeterminate 
term of from zero to thirty years, reasonably recognizing, in accord with the PSI, 
that there were numerous aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. R139:3-5. 
That term of imprisonment distinguishes this case from those defendant relies on, 
each of which held that lengthy minimum terms resulting from consecutive 
sentences deprived the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to act in accord with the 
defendants' progress towards rehabilitation. Aplt. Br. at 8-10. See State v. Galli, 967 
P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (consecutive sentences aggregating to a minimum of 
fifteen years where the trial courts "may have not have given weight to certain 
mitigation circumstances"); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995) 
(consecutive sentences aggregating to a minimum of sixty years); State v. Strurik, 846 
P.2d 1297,1301-02 (Utah 1993) (consecutive sentences aggregating to a minimum of 
twenty-four years excessive in absence of offender's extreme youth and absence of 
18 
prior violent crimjes). State v. Perez, is distinguishable on the trial court's almost total 
.«. .o consider any of the statutorily required sentencing factors. 2002 UT App 
In sum, MIL1 trial luml h.ninn1, ninskliTni nil ul llr -.Mlulnnly lequni'd 
sentencing factors, including defendant's rehafcri 1 itnl: • • •< . 
no reasonable person would disagree with the court's decision to sentence 
defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment.6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted September /z) , 2008. 
MARKL. SHURTT^F* 
V+<*h Attorney General 
6
 Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective failing to argue 
for probation or concurrent prison terms, given his rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at 
13,15. In light of the discussion above, discussion of this claim is unnecessary. See 
State v. Kelley, 2000 LT 41, % 26,1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does 
not constitute inefiective assistance of counsel/') 
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Addendum A 
§76-3-401 CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 1 . Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations Definil 1 : i i 
(1) A court: shall determine, if a defendant lias been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if 'the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are.to run concurrently or consecutive 
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
iZl In d e t e n n i n ^ are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutivelj i£ 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court, may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court, imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed .may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except 
provided under Subsection (6)(b) 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum, sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial, sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation, in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
• (a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced ai differ cut omes for coe or ooze offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 129, § 1, eff. July 
1, 2002. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on July 20, 2007) 
MR. DELICINO: Your Honor, the last matter I have is 
Mr. Salters. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's have Mr. Salters brought 
up. 
MS. MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN: Andrea Martinez-Griffin for the 
State. 
THE COURT: Mr. Delicino, you may proceed. 
MR. DELICINO: Your Honor, I have reviewed the pre-
sentence report. I've also talked to Mr. Salters about the 
recommendation in the pre-sentence report. 
Mr. Salters would like to inform the Court that he 
has been working on trying to get in some in-patient programs 
for the past few weeks. He's had some difficulty doing so 
because he was incarcerated at one point when he was trying 
to set up appointments with the social services coordinator 
of Legal Defender's Office. He was able last week to set up 
an appointment; made that appointment this week to see about 
what programs he could get into, and then set up basically an 
evaluation date. At that last meeting essentially they informed 
him that they would screen him. 
You know, I apologize for the delay. We've had some 
difficulty coordinating dates. Because Mr. Salters has been 
periodically incarcerated it's been difficult to coordinate with 
-(jl Defender1' 3 Oiiice and then social services department there 
" *r what programs mi ght be avai1ab 1 e to Mr. S a11ers. 
I be 1 i e v e I ir S a J 1: e r s wo u 1 d 1 i ke t o a ddr ess the Co 12r t 
regarding (inaudible) his sentence. 
': >i 1 , 
Mr. Salters? 
- SALTERS: Your Hone . 
h^ve — . ,:e to get in a program if possible to give me some 
p, - ^ r-e. - reatir.ent • 
I11 P, 1 3 1: i ght. I s t here anything else, 
: * Salters? 
•• 2RS: N • 
THE COURT: Any 1 egal reason of. which you are aware why 
I should not proceed to / niilcnr* „ Mi T >*j I ii inu:' 
MR, DELICINO; Not at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: With respect, then, to the charge c: >f tl .e 
00ssession or use of a controlled substance -- you want to speak 
0 make it clear that the State adamantly concurs with the 
1 r e c oiriine n d a t :i o 1 1 s . 
2 THE COURT: ~" f o l l o w i n g t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , so 
3 M S . M A R T ? " " cr,—:-•• , I 
4 clear, 
5 THE COURT: what's that? 
-4-
1 MS. MARTINEZ-GRIFFIN: I just wanted to make that clear 
2 on the record that the State concurs with that recommendation. 
3 THE COURT: All right. With respect to the charge of 
4 the possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree 
5 felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to five at the state prison. 
6 That's in the matter ending 2522. 
7 In the matter ending 908 in the charge of possession 
8 or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, I'm 
9 sentencing you to zero to five at the state prison. Second 
10 count, the forge — or the count of forgery in that matter, a 
11 third degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to five at the 
12 state prison. 
13 In the matter ending 235, the charge of possession or 
14 use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, zero to 
15 five at the state prison. 
16 In the matter ending 97 6, the charge of forgery, a third 
17 degree felony, zero to five at the state prison. In the matter 
18 ending 976, obstruction of justice, a third degree felony, zero 
19 to five at the state prison. All will run consecutive to one 
20 another. I'm imposing the sentence of zero to 30 years at the 
21 Utah State Prison. 
22 The reason for running them consecutive is as follows. 
23 One, you have established repeated instances of criminal conduct. 
24 Two, these cases involve multiple charges. Three, your attitude 
25 is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting, 
-5 ^  
j:.d " :a continued your criminal actiT? '»"' : :i lbject 1: :: e i ,f 
-• ion, vou have engaged in 25 yes.b .i ongoing criminal 
behavior. Ii'h * re to take it to an end, Mr. Salters. Y M I ti.nv 
tipped I . 
MR'. DELICINO: Thank you, your Honor. That concludes my 
matters, if 1 may hij excuse*:!, f I i y I I • (\u r »j i» y:ur Honor? 
THE COURT: You may, I'm >»>rry, Mr, Delicino. 
(Hearing concluded) 
